SOME LEGAL PROBLEMS IN STATE PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION by KESSLER, EDWIN
SOME LEGAL PROBLEMS IN STATE PERSONAL
INCOME TAXATION
EDWIN KssLER, JR.
The publication of income-tax returns has lately called forth consid-
erable polemic literature directed against the very levying of such taxes;
a recent amendment to the Florida Constitution prohibits their imposi-
tion in that State. The advisability of taxing income as such is not,
however, my present thesis, nor do I propose to discuss here the ques-
tion of privacy versus publicity of returns. I shall limit myself to the
consideration of a number of legal problems which inevitably arise when
the several states undertake the taxation of personal incomes. Most,
if not all, of these problems have an economic aspect and the decisions
of the courts will be largely controlled by the economic philosophy of
the judges. It follows that the lawyer who would debate these ques-
tions must have some appreciation of the economic principles involved,
but in this article I shall presuppose, rather than attempt to supply, the
requisite background.1
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAXES
Whether income taxes should differentiate between "earned" and
so-called "unearned" income or be progressive or both is not my pres-
ent concern; but the first question I shall consider is whether, if such
taxes are enacted into law, they are to be held valid under the usual pro-
visions in the State Constitutions that no person shall be deprived of
his life, liberty, or property without due process of law, that no one
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws, and that taxes shall be
uniform.
The courts have very properly held that these provisions do not
require identical treatment of all kinds of persons and property subject
to the taxing power, but permit reasonable classification (provided that
all members of any particular class are treated alike) and, since that is
necessarily- involved in any useful classification, discrimination. Taxing
"unearned" income at a higher rate than income resulting from the
individual efforts of the recipient, exempting the first thousand dollars
of one's income, or taxing the second at a higher rate than the first
thousand does not seem so obviously unreasonable as to be held uncon-
stitutional in spite of the general presumption of constitutionality.
2
Yet that conclusion has been reached in several jurisdictions.3 It will
'Seligman. Essays in Taxation (1921) ; Seligman. The Income Tax (i9zI).
'hiking Fund Cases (1878) 99 U. S. 700, 718; contra: Hackett. TJhe Consti-
tutionality of the Graduated Income Tax Law (I916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 427.
SEliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimes (1920) 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56;
Opinion, of the Justices (igi) 220 Mass. 613, io8 N. E. 570; In re Harkness'
Estate (r922) 83 Okla. 107, 204 Pac. gir.
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be reached in more if the courts follow the logic of their decisions that
progressive inheritance taxes are unconstitutional.4
-No reason would justify a court in upholding a progressive income
tax while holding a progressive inheritance tax invalid under such pro-
visions as these. But the converse of this proposition is not equally
true. Progressive inheritance taxes may be sustained on grounds which
apply not at all to income taxes. In Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings
Bank,5 the Supreme Court of the United States sustained a graded
inheritance tax law of Illinois on the ground that "An inheritance tax
is not one on the property but one on the succession. The right to take
property by devise or descent is the creature of the law and not a natural
right-a privilege, and therefore the authority which confers it may
impose conditions upon it." The principle that there can be but slight
limitations to the regulatory power of the states over such subjects as
they may absolutely prohibit obviously has no application to income-
taxes.
The Supreme Court of Alabama held a progressive income-tax uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it was a discriminatory property tax.6 It
is generally assumed that a progressive property tax would be uncon-
stitutional under the Federal Constitution. Assuming that a state,
progressive, personal income-tax had been sustained by the state courts,
the argument that taxes on income are in reality taxes on the source of
that income would be the mnost serious obstacle in the way when it came
to run the gauntlet of the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court has shown that it is no slave to logic and, in these days of socio-
logical jurisprudence, many may consider involved formalistic reason-
ing useless. Yet that Court, not unlike courts of lesser rank, is desirous
of disposing of new problems so as to do violence to as few of the gen-
eral principles on which its prior decisions are based as need be, while,
at the same time, doing justice to the new facts presented in the issue.
Let us, then, turn to an examination of the cases to determine where
lies the preponderance of legal analogy, the answer pointed out by the
precedents.
In the famous Pollock cases,7 which led directly to the adoption of the
'State v. Gorman (889) 40 Minn. 232, 41 N. W. 948; State v. Ferris (1895)
53 Ohio St. 314, 41 N. E. 579; State v. Svitzler (1878) 143 Mo. 287, 45 So. 245:
"The classification on the basis of amount is artificial, without rhyme or reason."
1 (I898) 170 U. S. 283, I8 Sup. Ct. 594; Mager v. Grima (I85o, U. S.) 8 How.
49o; Matter of Estate of Saft (1893) 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1O96; see Maxwell
v. Bugbee (1919) 25o U. S. 525, 541, 40 Sup. Ct. 2, 7: "The tax is not upon the
property but upon the privilege of succession which the state may grant or with-
hold." Contra: -Nunnemacher v. State (19o6) 129 Wis. i9o, io8 N. W. 627, on
the ground that the right to transmit or succeed to property could not be abrogated
in this day and age.
SSupra note 3.
'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673;
158 U. S. 6ol, 15 Sup. Ct. 912; Powell, Stock Dividends, Direct Taxes and the
Sixteenth Amendment (1920) 20 CoL L. REV. 536.
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Sixteenth Amendment, a tax on the income from real and personal prop-
erty was said to be equivalent to and as "direct" as a tax on the land
or personalty and was held to violate the requirement of the Federal
Constitution that "direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
states according to their respective numbers."" The Sixteenth Amend-
ment provides that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States," but says nothing as to the "directness" of
an income tax, whether it is or is not a tax on the source of the income.9
The language, if not the holding, of the Pollock cases lends strength to
the argument that progressive income taxes are unconstitutional, being
discriminatory property taxes.
Those who advocate this position claim to find further support in the
long line of decisions that a state tax on the gross receipts of a corpora-
tion engaged in interstate commerce is unconstitutional.' 0 A complete
answer to this claim is that net income from interstate commerce may
be taxed, provided only that it is not discriminated against as such."
All the state income taxes are levied on net income.
But there is a more fundamental reason why the interstate commerce
tax-decisions are of no significance here. The Federal Constitution
gives Congress the "Power to regulate Commerce.. . among the sev-
eral States"'11 and this has been held to prohibit state regulation of
interstate commerce ;18 but there is strictly no inhibition on the states to
tax interstate commerce and taxation falling short of regulation is not
unconstitutional.' 4 These decisions, then, depend solely on the effect of
'U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3; ibid. Art. I, sec. 9, cl. 4.
"Peck & Co. v. Lowe (1918) 247 U. S. i65, 38 Sup. Ct. 432: "The Sixteenth
Amendment does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects but
merely removes all -occasion which otherwise might exist for an apportionment
among the states of taxes laid on income, whether it be derived from one source
or another."
"Phila. & So. S. S. Co. v. Penn. (1887) I22 U. S. 326, 7 Sup. Ct III8;
Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas (19o8) 210 U. S. 217, 28 Sup. Ct. 638. See
Int. Paper Co. v. Mass. (1918) 246 U. S. i35, 38 Sup. Ct 292.
' U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek (ig98) 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499; Shaffer
v. Carter (920) 252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221.
U. S. Const. Art I, sec. 8, cl. 3.
"Galveston, etc. Ry. v. Texas, supra, note 10 at p. 227: "If it (the tax) bears
upon commerce among the states so directly as to amount to a regulation in a
relatively immediate way, it will not be saved by name or form." Phila. & So.
S. S. Co. v. Penn., supra note ii, at p. 328: "The corporate franchises, the
property, the business, the income of corporations created by a state may
undoubtedly be taxed by the state; but in imposing such taxes care should be taken
not to interfere with or hamper, directly or by indirection, interstate or foreign
commerce or any other matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal
Government."
"This rule is well stated by Prof. T. R. Powell in State Income Taxes and the
Commerce Clause (1922) 31 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 799: "Law, like politics, makes
strange bedfellows. Among the queerest of such companions are the doctrine
that the states cannot tax interstate commerce and the fact that they can. As
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the tax and not on the subject of the tax. Obviously, many statutes
might be unconstitutional regulations of interstate commerce without
being taxes at all.
For the same reason the argument based on the Federal instrumen-
tality tax-decisions must be dismissed; for any law which hampers the
United States in the exercise of its governmental functions will be
unconstitutional irrespective of the subject-matter of the tax.'
5 A
property tax may well be a burden on the person who owns the property
but no court would hold it a personal tax for that reason. Yet we can-
not lightly pass over the reasoning in the recent case of Gillespie v.
Oklahoma.'6 In Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf R.R. v. Harrison
7 the
Supreme Court had ruled that a lessee of restricted Indian lands could
not be taxed by a state on his gross receipts from the use of such prop-
erty where the tax was in addition to general ad valorem taxes. Later,
in Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co.,' a gross production tax was held bad
though imposed on such lessee in lieu of the ordinary property taxes.
In the Gillespie case a tax on the net income derived from such lands
was held invalid. The Court said:19 "The same considerations that
invalidate a tax upon the leases20 invalidate a tax upon the profit of the
leases, and, stopping short of theoretical possibilities, a tax upon such
profits is a direct hamper upon the effort of the United States to make
the best terms that it can for its wards." That was sufficient to decide
the case but, not content with this, the Court indulged in the following
dictum :2 "A tax upon the leases is a tax upon the power to make
them, and could be used to destroy the power to make them. The step
from this to the invalidity of the tax upon income from the leases is
not long. In cases where the principal is absolutely immune from
interference an inquiry is allowed into the source from which such
income is derived and if a part of it comes from such a source the tax
is 'pro tanto' void," citing the Pollock cases. It would be difficult to
explain away this language; the Supreme Court has manifested a
willingness to ignore it and to act on contrary premises.
might be anticipated, the doctrine and the fact do not dwell together in perfect
amity.... The truth is that there is a wrong way and a right way for the states
to tax interstate commerce." Were the rule otherwise it would amount to giving
a bounty to interstate commerce.
" Salaries of federal employees are exempt from state taxation. Evans v. Gore
(igi) 253 U. S. 245. 40 Sup. Ct 550; Dobbins v. Conm's. of Erie County
(1842, U. S.) i6 Pet. 435; and so is income from obligations of the United States
which have been made tax-exempt by Act of Congress. Lantz v. Hanna (I922)
rii Kans. 461, 207 Pac. 767; cf. Farmers' Bank v. Minn. (1914) 232 U. S. 56.
34 Sup. Ct 354-
"(1922) 257 U. S. 5o, 42 Sup. Ct. 171.
(1914) 235 U. S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27.
(1918) 247 U. S. 503, 38 Sup. Ct. 426.
"Supra note 16, at p. 5o6, 42 Sup. Ct. 72.
10Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma (i9x6) 240 U. S. 522, 36 Sup. Ct. 453.
1 .Spra note i6, at p. 505, 42 Sup. Ct. 172.
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The Constitution of the United States prohibits Congress from levy-
ing any tax, impost, or duty on exports.2 " Yet in Peck & Co. v. Lowe 23
the Court sustained the application of the Federal Income Tax to the
net income of an export-house. The ground of the decision was that
the tax, being laid generally on net income, not on income from expor-
tation because of its source or in the way of discrimination, and affect-
ing only the net receipts from exportation after all expenses were paid
and losses adjusted and the recipient was free to use the income as he
chose, only indirectly and remotely affected exportation and could not
be said to be a tax thereon. The case, of necessity, is a square holding
that a tax on the net income from exportation is not a tax on exporta-
tion.
The decision in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R.,24 upholding the Fed-
eral Progressive Income-Tax, has no significance here. Congressional
action is not limited by an "equal protection of the laws" clause, as is
state action, and the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment has
been held not to be a limitation on the taxing power conferred upon
Congress by Article i, sec. 8 of the Constitution.
2 5
The result of this discussion seems to be that the United States
Supreme Court may logically hold valid a state, progressive, personal
income-tax though it would not do as much for a progressive property
tax. But will the income-taxes be sustained? In so far as they may
interfere with any federal instrumentality, certainly not; but apart from
this it seems well-nigh certain that they will be upheld. That result may
be reached by regarding them as personal taxes, measured by the income
of the recipient; by regarding income as a new thing, separate and dis-
tinct from the source from which it is derived; by holding that even
a property tax may be progressive if the form of the tax is such as to
make allowance for the productiveness of the property and the personal
condition of the owner; or, finally, by disregarding formalistic reason-
ing and relying on grounds of economic expediency. Obviously the
last method has all the advantages of simplicity and the Supreme Court
has manifested a willingness to follow this path of least resistance.
In Knovlton v. Moore" a federal progressive inheritance tax was
sustained. That case amounted to considerably more than a reaffirm-
ance of the decision in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings BankY.2
There is no basis for contending that the Federal Government could
abolish the right, existing under state laws, to inherit or take property
under the validly executed will of a competent testator, and the tax could
not be sustained as a condition annexed to the privilege of succession.
- U. S. Const. Art. i, sec. 9. cl. 5.
' (IOI8) 247 U. S. 165, 38 Sup. Ct. 432.
' (I916) 240 U. S. I, 36 Sup. Ct. 236.
Ibid. 24 and cases cited, 36 Sup. Ct. at p. 2
(oo) 178 U. S. 41, 2o Sup. Ct. 747. Brewer, J., dissented.
1 Supra note 5.
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The Court said :28 "Taxes imposed with reference to the ability of the
person upon whom the burden is placed to bear the same have been
levied from the foundation of government. So, also, some authorita-
tive thinkers, and a number of economic writers, contend that a pro-
gressive tax is more just and equal than a proportional one. In the
absence of constitutional limitation, ihe question whether it is or is not
is legislative and not judicial."2 9 This language is sweeping and
unqualified but it goes much further than the actual decision demanded.
The court was not considering a tax on property but an excise on the
transmission of a decedent's estate; the former falls due every year; the
latter, once in .a life-time. The dictum is of value, however, to show
the attitude of the court towards progression in taxation generally.
In Shaffer v. Carter"0 it was argued that since a state cannot tax
property permanently situated in another state it cannot tax the income
from such property, though it be earned by a resident. Mr. Justice
Pitney replied: "This argument, upon analysis, resolves itself into a
mere question of definitions, and has no legitimate bearing upon any
question raised under the Federal Constitution. For where the ques-
tion is whether a state taxing law contravenes rights secured by that
instrument, the decision must depend not upon any mere question of
form, construction or definition, but upon the practical operation and
effect of the tax imposed." The Court declined to characterize the tax
as-one on the person or on the property.
(To be continued)
Supra note 26, at p. og, 20 Sup. Ct. at p. 774.
This was the basis of the Wisconsin decision sustaining the state, personal,
progressive income-tax. Income Tax Cases (1912) 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673;
State v. Johnson (igg) i7o Wis. 218, 175 N. W. 58g.
- (1920) 252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221.
